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INFLUENCES OF AMBIGUITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF IRAQ
DR. SABAH AL-BAWI∗
When the organizers of the University of Pennsylvania’s Conference on the Rule of Law
in Iraq and Afghanistan asked me to present on one of the most important challenges facing Iraq
during the coming decade, I chose to examine the ambiguity of the provisions of Iraq’s
Constitution that relate to Iraq’s administrative system. The ambiguity in these provisions is one
of the most complicated problems facing Iraq, and it is rooted in the fervent discussions between
new Iraqi politicians and leaders about the shape that the Republic of Iraq should adopt: the
simple or the federal shape.
Although the Iraqi Constitution has adopted a binary system with a federal authority
when it comes to the relations with the Kurdistan region, and a decentralized administration when
it comes to the relation between the central government and the governorates that are not
incorporated into a region, the Constitution’s unclear provisions have caused several types of
conflicts in different fields. In this present brief, I will focus on two examples to prove the
influence of the ambiguous provisions on the administrative system of Iraq.
I.

FIRST EXAMPLE: THE AMBIGUOUS DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION

Decentralization simply means that recognized local interests will be run by elected
commissions that should cooperate with the central government and submit to the central
government’s supervision when fulfilling their missions. The elected commission runs the local
interests according to laws that are passed by the central legislative authority. Any contrary
resolutions adopted by the local commissions that conflict with the central authority’s laws or
resolutions are voidable.
But when we analyze the decentralized administration that has been adopted by the Iraqi
Constitution, we find a special and unknown type of decentralization that could be described as
closer to confederacy than to decentralization. According to Article 122, Section 5 of the Iraqi
Constitution,1 the elected commissions that run the local interests of the governorates are not
compelled to cooperate with the central executive power continuously or to submit to any type of
supervision or control by the capitol. Moreover, according to Article 2, Section 1 of the Law of
Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region No. 21 of 2008,2 the provincial councils have a
legislative authority that legislates in undetermined fields, while other federal authorities have
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Article 122, Section 5, Doustour Joumhourait al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.

2

Article 2, Section 1, Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region No. 21 of 2008 (Iraq).
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determined fields to practice its specializations in. The local legislative authority supersedes the
federal legislative authority when it comes to shared powers between the federal authority, the
governorates, and with regard to the un-exclusive powers of the federal government according to
Article 115 of the Constitution. This is known to be strange in a decentralized system. The
surprise here is that the provincial councils are not compelled to obey the enactments of the
central legislative power. Even more surprising is that, according to Article 115 of the Iraqi
Constitution itself, in the case of a dispute or conflict between federal and local laws about
powers shared between them, priority shall be given to the law of the governorate, and not to the
federal law. Moreover, Article 110 enumerates powers that are exclusively held by the federal
government, but Article 123 permits the federal government to delegate even its exclusive powers
to the governorates according to a law should be issued later.
In addition, the Constitution is ambiguous about the mechanisms for defining and
exercising the broad powers granted to the governorates that are not incorporated into a region.
Article 122, Section 2 of the Constitution stipulates, “governorates that are not incorporated in a
region shall be granted broad administrative and financial authorities to enable them to manage
their affairs in accordance with the principle of decentralized administration, and this shall be
regulated by law.” However, neither the provision of the Constitution did define the meaning of
the broad authorities it grants, nor did the aforementioned law of the governorates.
This unclear system of administration has created several challenges for the governorates
and for the federal government. The constitutional and legal provisions raise the governorates to
the sky, but the lack of a mechanism for defining their authority throws them to the earth. This
situation has created conflicts between the two levels of government: governorates cling to the
provisions granting them broad authorities, and the federal government clings to the provisions
establishing a decentralized system with ambiguous mechanisms for distributing power. This
conflict has obstructed the goals of national development, weakened the people’s trust in their
elected provincial councils, increased resentment as a result of poor services provided by disabled
local commissions, and created a spirit of hostility between the provincial councils and central
ministries.
II. SECOND EXAMPLE: THE AMBIGUITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOR MANAGING REGIONAL OIL AND GAS
A constitutional provision has created one of the most complicated problems between the
federal government and local governments of governorates and regions. Article 112, Section 1 of
the Constitution stipulates, “the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields . . . .”
This provision has created a fiercely antagonistic relationship between the federal and regional
governments, especially the regional government of Kurdistan. Article 112, Section 1 only gives
central government just guidelines for undertaking the management of oil and gas extracted from
current fields, but it does not provide it any specializations for exploitation or any other use. The
provision also only applies to present fields, not future ones. Furthermore, the provision only
applies to oil and gas already extracted, and not to oil and gas still in the bottom of the earth.
The regional government of Kurdistan clings to a narrow interpretation of the provision,
explaining that the federal government should cooperate with the local governments to manage
the extracted oil and gas from the present fields in 2005 only. They argue that according to
Article 112, the exploitation of oil and gas not yet extracted from present and future fields should
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be controlled by the regional governments. The federal government asserts that it has the
authority to control exploitation, citing Article 111 of the Constitution, which states, “Oil and gas
are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”
Although there is a national consensus that the Constitution should be changed,
amending the ambiguous Iraqi Constitution is the largest challenge, since it is one of the most
inflexible constitutions in the world. It is our social problem, not our social contract, as JeanJacques Rousseau (June 28, 1712–July 2, 1778) supposes.
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